How Lego Bocks Explain Why Bloomreach Bought Exponea
Yesterday brought news that CDP Exponea had been purchased by ecommerce recommendation engine Bloomreach. The deal almost exactly parallels last year’s merger between RichRelevance and Manthan, as well the smaller-scale combination of CrossEngage with Gpredictive. It also recalls other recent CDP acquisitions including Acquia buying AgilOne, Chapsvision buying NP6, SAP buying Emarsys, and Wunderkind buying SmarterHQ.
It’s easy (and correct) to see these deals as efforts to assemble comprehensive marketing suites. But it’s not just that the buyers want to add a CDP their collection. These deals all involve CDPs with marketing automation functions (that is, segmentation, message selection, campaigns, personalization, and cross-channel orchestration). CDP Institute labels these as “campaign” or “delivery”; others sometimes refer to them as “activation” or “execution” CDPs. This type of CDP provides the biggest headstart towards building a marketing suite. The drive to build suites clarifies why predictive analytics vendors Bloomreach, RichRelevance, and Gpredictive are such frequent partners: stand-alone predictive tools are missing nearly all the features needed for a full marketing platform, so they have the most to gain from buying a CDP that fills those gaps.
Of course, the biggest CDP acquisition of all, Twilio’s purchase of Segment, doesn’t fit this mold. Segment was more of a pure-play or “data” CDP, limited to assembling and sharing customer profiles. But Twilio isn’t looking to build a marketing suite; their core business is call centers and (after buying SendGrid) email messaging. They have their sights set on providing a communications layer to support all customer-facing operations, including sales and service. Still a suite, but a different kind.
The drive to construct comprehensive marketing suites is interesting because it conflicts with the current notion that marketers don’t want big, integrated products but instead want to create their own collections of components, building some parts with the latest self-service tools and connecting the rest through microservices, open APIs, and other technical wizardry. The pure vision is a distributed, non-hierarchical architecture, modeled roughly on the Internet itself, where any system can connect with any other system. The more practical vision is a platform-centric world where any system can plug into a central platform that provides basic services. In both visions, companies construct their own, highly customized collections of systems that are perfectly tailored to their needs.
Simply put, the vendors assembling these suites are betting that vision is wrong. They believe – based no doubt on what buyers are telling them – that companies still want to buy an integrated product that meets their needs without any assembly required. The purely practical reason is that companies don’t assemble systems for their own sake; they assemble them as tools to do what’s really important, which is to make money (usually by delivering goods and services to customers). Sure, you can build a pickup truck from Lego blocks and you might even do that for fun. But if you actually need to haul something, you’ll go to a dealer and buy one.
In other words, we still live in a world ruled by Raab’s Law, which is “Suites win”. (More formally: In the long run, suites always win the competition between suites and best-of-breed systems.) Platforms don’t change this as much as you’d think, because customers always want the platforms themselves to add more features and make them tightly integrated. It’s true that buyers want third-party applications that can extend platform capabilities. It’s also in the platform vendors’ interest to be open to those applications since they add value to the platform at little cost to the platform owner. But there’s a time and effort cost to the user of selecting, connecting, and learning to use each new application, regardless of whether the app is “free” or how easily it connects. Users are very aware of these costs, which is why they want the core platform to offer as many features as possible. Put another way: the value of applications is they enable users to add features a platform lacks; but the more features a platform provides internally, the more value it provides from the start. This pushes platform vendors to add features that save users from the need to install apps. Of course, the art of platform management is knowing which features are popular and standardized enough to be incorporated.
As new features are added, platforms increasingly resemble integrated suites. The significant difference from suites is that platforms offer users the option to replace the platform’s default components with external alternatives. But if the platform builders do their jobs correctly, users will find less need to do that over time.
This is what makes campaign CDPs so attractive to companies attempting to construct a new marketing suite. The marketing features of the CDPs provide a core of functionality that marketers are looking for. In addition, and crucially, the core CDP features make it easier for the suite vendor to integrate components of its own system and also enable the vendor to offer platform-style flexibility by connecting with external systems.
What, then, do these acquisitions tell us about the future of the CDP industry? The first thing to realize is that most CDPs already fall into the campaign and delivery categories (70% of the industry, measured on company count or employment, according to our statistics). Most of these firms actually started as marketing automation, personalization, or delivery systems and added CDP capabilities later. Some already provide an integrated marketing suite; the others can expand in that direction on their own or through combinations with other products.
It will be increasingly difficult for this type of CDP to survive without a broad set of marketing functions. Competitive pressures will force them to improve those features while treating core CDP capabilities of building and sharing unified profiles as just one talking point. We’ve already seen limit their investment in CDP features and instead partner with other data-oriented CDPs to meet those needs. (We also expect these firms to increasingly specialize by industry and company size. This makes it easier for them to build connectors to operational systems such as point of sale in retail or reservations in travel, as well as building industry-specific features, hiring industry-expert staff, and fine-tuning delivery and pricing models to meet target price-points.)
The other 30% of the CDP industry are vendors specializing in data management and analytics. We call these “data” and “analytics” CDPs. Many started life as tag managers, data collection, or predictive modeling systems; others were built as CDPs from the begining. As the Twilio/Segment deal illustrated, data CDPs may also be acquisition targets, especially for companies that are aiming to build a corporate-level backbone rather than a marketing suite. Firms that aren’t acquired will be able to remain independent by offering best-of-breed customer data unification services to companies that need and can pay for a best-of-breed solution. These will likely be large enterprises. This type of CDP will increasingly be purchased by IT and data departments, rather than marketing, and will come to look more like IT tools than end-user applications. As such, they’ll find themselves increasingly competing with general purpose data management tools from other software providers and from data management and analytics tools built into the big cloud platforms (Google Cloud, AWS, Azure). So far, the specialized features of the most sophisticated data CDPs are more advanced than what’s available elsewhere. Some of these vendors will continue to innovate and ultimately emerge as strong leaders in this segment. Others will probably withdraw into niches or sell themselves to other companies that want to jumpstart their own CDP offerings.
One happy byproduct of these developments may be a final end to the near-theological debate over the proper definition of “Customer Data Platform”. As the campaign and delivery CDPs position themselves as marketing suites or platforms, they’re likely to move away from CDP as their primary label. But they’ll still need the world to know that they offer the core CDP capabilities of unified profile creation and sharing. With any luck at all, they’ll handle this by labeling those features as “CDP” when they describe their system capabilities. This should eventually lead to a more consistent use of the CDP term throughout the market and, thus, less confusion over what it means. The data and decision CDPs already define CDP in terms of the same core capabilities. Some of those firms are today pulling away from verbal confusion by labeling themselves as “infrastructure” or “pipeline” customer data platforms. If the narrower definition of CDP reasserts itself, they may come back to adopting the CDP label itself.
